arguments about trust, seeing it as rooted in expectations about individual interests. Important puzzles remain; in particular, the relationship between institutions and trust remains, for the most part, unexplored (Knight, 1998) .
One important source of evidence about trust and cooperation is "industrial districts," geographically concentrated clusters of small-firm production. Surprisingly, they have received little attention from political scientists, with a few important exceptions (Herrigel, 1996b; Locke, 1995; Piore & Sabel, 1984; Putnam, 1993) . This is in spite of the fact that they offer relevant insights about the sources of trust and cooperation. Industrial districts involve an extraordinary level of dis-integration of the production process, so that tasks that are usually undertaken within firm hierarchy are carried out through cooperation between small independent producers. Despite the economic efficiencies of this form of production, it is exceedingly rare in advanced industrial democracies (Miller, 1992) .
It is difficult for dominant theories of trust and/or cooperation to explain industrial districts. Although vertical integration is the "canonical problem" of the new institutional economics (Williamson, 2000) , the extraordinary level of dis-integration found in classical industrial districts is a reproach to transaction cost economists, who would argue that highly sensitive transactions should take place within the firm rather than between firms, because of the risk of opportunism (Williamson, 1985) .
However, political culture, the other dominant approach to trust and cooperation within political science, hardly fares better. Some scholars have suggested that industrial districts support the argument that culture has an important effect in determining political success and economic outcomes. Robert Putnam (1993) , in his arguments about trust and social capital, argues that civic factors are key to economic success and discusses Italian industrial districts as a key example of the links between civics and economics that he claims to have identified. He concludes,
What is crucial about these small-firm industrial districts, conclude most observers, is mutual trust, social cooperation, and a well-developed sense of civic duty. . . . It is no surprise to learn that these . . . industrial districts are concentrated in those very regions of north-central Italy that we have highlighted as centers of civic traditions. (p. 161) Although Putnam's general findings about the relationship between economic and cultural factors have been claimed as evidence in favor of political culture (Inglehart, 1990 (Inglehart, , 1997 , industrial districts pose an extremely perplexing puzzle for the political culture account. The loci classici of the phenomenon are located in Italy: They appear to be rare in other advanced indus-trial democracies. Yet scholars of political culture, ever since Almond and Verba (1963) , have depicted Italy as a prime example of low interpersonal trust (Inglehart, 1990; LaPalombara, 1965) . Survey data suggest that Italy has had lower levels of interpersonal trust among its citizens than any other European country (Inglehart, 1990) . Nor do regional differences within Italy affect its relative ranking; the "civic" north has been ranked below all other EU countries in Eurobarometer survey research.
1 On one hand, Italy, including northern Italy, appears to have lower levels of generalized interpersonal trust than other European countries. On the other, it has enjoyed considerable economic benefits from a form of production that involves extensive trust and cooperation among firms, and which "high trust" countries seem unable to replicate (Locke, 1995; Sforzi, 1996) .
In this article, I wish to suggest that these two puzzles posed by industrial districts-the existence of apparently economically irrational forms of trust in the political economy, 2 and the failure of political culture theory to explain why high-trust forms of production can be found in a low-trust country-can be explained by institutions. 3 The rational choice literature on institutions and cooperation between actors, 4 parallels, but has not been comprehensively applied to, the study of trust. Yet as Jack Knight (1998; see also Farrell & Knight, 2003) has argued, trust, social capital, and civility are closely bound up with informal institutions. This article develops Knight's suggestion that trust can be analyzed as an effect of institutions. Furthermore, it provides a comparative analysis of the effects of institutions on trust. If institutions have important independent effects on trust, and thus on cooperation, 1. See Inglehart (1990) . Inglehart (1997) more recently suggests that diffuse interpersonal trust in Italy has slowly increased. Even if this is so, it does not explain why industrial districts flourished in a period (the 1980s) when survey data suggested that diffuse interpersonal trust among Italians was extraordinarily low.
2. I note that I only discuss trust and cooperation in industrial districts insofar as they are found in vertical supply relations. Sociologists are almost certainly correct in arguing that many other forms of cooperative activity in industrial districts, such as technological innovation, are much less amenable to study through the rational actor model, insofar as interests are likely to be fluid. I am grateful to Gary Herrigel and Jonathan Zeitlin for this point.
3. This article should not be taken as an attack on the study of political culture tout court. I share with students of political culture the conviction that cultural variables play an important role in the explanation of political behavior. See further Farrell and Knight (2003) . Although the "oversocialized" account of human action proposed by some political culture theorists (e.g., Eckstein, 1988) and embraced in Inglehart (1990) is highly problematic, other conceptions of political culture (e.g., Barnes, 1988; Elkins & Simeon, 1979) view it in a much less totalizing way.
4. For example, Calvert (1995b Calvert ( , 1995c ; Greif (1994) ; Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast (1995) ; Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990); Miller (1992); variation in institutions will be associated with variations in trust between actors.
The article begins by seeking to combine the previously mentioned literature on institutions with the "encapsulated interest" account of trust developed by Russell Hardin (2002) and others (Levi, 1998) . It then examines two case studies of cooperation between firms in industrial districts, one in Stuttgart, the capital of the German Land (state) of Baden-Württemberg, and the other in Bologna, capital of the Italian region of Emilia-Romagna.
The article shows that the evidence supports the hypothesis that variation in trust between the two cases is in large part the result of variation in institutions, and suggests that a rational choice institutionalist approach may provide a good explanation of observed patterns of cooperation in the two case studies.
TRUST, COOPERATION, AND INSTITUTIONS
In the past number of years, Russell Hardin (2002) , together with others, has developed the so-called encapsulated interest account of trust, which seeks to define more precisely the relationship between trust, trustworthiness, and cooperation.
5 Trust, as Hardin defines it, is a three-part phenomenon: X trusts Y with regard to matter Z. Trust can vary in each of these dimensions: the person trusting, the person being trusted, and the matter at issue in the trust relationship. I trust you, for example, with regard to the $10 that I lent you at lunchtime yesterday; I may not trust you with my life savings. I may not trust another friend enough to lend him $10 for lunch; you, in contrast, might. In Hardin's account, trust involves beliefs concerning interest, as broadly defined. I trust you about a certain matter to the extent that I believe that your interest encapsulates mine with regard to that matter. Finally, where the interests of two parties are consonant for reasons that have nothing to do with their particular relationship, it is difficult to see how trust meaningfully applies.
Although this account is compatible with the standard rational actor model, it is not limited to it; trustworthiness may turn on emotional or normative commitments. For Hardin, trust is a belief or expectation: It can be distinguished from cooperation, which is a form of action, perhaps taken on the basis of trust. Hardin's account is difficult to reconcile with political culture theories of trust, which have tended to focus on diffuse, interpersonal trust. In the words of Lucian Pye (1965) , Political cultures are built either upon the fundamental faith that it is possible to trust and work with fellowmen or upon the expectation that most people are to be distrusted and that strangers in particular are likely to be dangerous. (p. 22) Hardin, in contrast, focuses relentlessly on the particular-whether I can trust you, or you can trust me, with regard to a certain matter or set of matters. The encapsulated interest account sees trust as an expectation or belief rather than a diffuse cultural orientation that results from socialization (Inglehart, 1990) .
The encapsulated interest account is reconcilable with recent rational choice work on institutions. Following Douglass North (1990) and Jack Knight (1992) , I treat institutions as sets of rules, which may lead actors to converge on a particular equilibrium by providing actors with information as to the likely strategies of others. This is not to imply that their origin or evolution can be explained in terms of their functional consequences.
6
What precise effects are institutions likely to have on trust relations? In this article, I suggest that formal and informal institutions are likely to be associated with quite different outcomes in terms of trust relations among individuals. Formal institutions involve written rules that are typically enforced by a third party such as the state; informal institutions involve unwritten rules that are typically enforced through bilateral relationships within a given community of actors. Formal institutions, such as laws or legally enforceable contracts, are usually relatively specific; they thus may induce clear ex-ante expectations about actors' likely strategies under circumstances that are foreseen and addressed by the institution. By the same token, they are likely to provide weak guidance when unanticipated circumstances arise. Informal institutions, in contrast, are diffuse, unwritten understandings; although they may provide less precise ex-ante expectations about actors' strategies, they are more easily adapted to previously unforeseen contingencies.
It is important to be clear: Trust cannot be reduced to mere institutioninduced expectations (Farrell & Knight, 2004) . Nonetheless, such expectations may serve as an important anchoring point for trusting relationships, insofar as they provide a technology that actors can employ to make credible commitments to each other. Formal and informal institutions will have different consequences for expectations, and thus for trust. Formal institutions may help actors to engage in tightly defined transactions with a wide variety of other actors that are not part of the same community, as long as the latter actors are subject to the appropriate institutions and the same third-party enforcer. Informal institutions, in contrast, may allow for relationships that involve a wider-and ex ante more diffuse-set of issues. However, these trust relations will only be possible with members of the same community, which will usually encompass a smaller set of actors. To adapt Hardin's (2002) terms, appropriate formal institutions will allow actor X to engage in relations with a wider range of other actors Y over a predefined set of matters Z; appropriate informal institutions will allow X to engage in relations with a narrower range of other actors Y but with regard to a broader and more diffuse set of matters Z.
This suggests that actors who wish to make credible commitments to each other in a setting where there are appropriate informal institutions will be able to do so with regard to a broader set of matters, some of which may not be readily definable ex ante (i.e., an unanticipated problem may arise after actors have already committed to each other). However, they will be limited to a smaller community of actors. 7 In contrast, actors in a setting that is dominated by formal institutions will only be able to use these institutions to anchor credible commitments over a narrower set of issues and will have considerable difficulty in making institution-based commitments regarding matters that cannot be anticipated in advance.
This general set of arguments has particular relevance for "flexibly specialized" modes of industrial production, such as machine production in certain regions of Italy and Germany, which involve significant ex-ante uncertainty (Hirst & Zeitlin, 1992; Piore & Sabel, 1984) . Flexible specialization imposes particular requirements on the vertical organization of production. Flexibly specialized firms may experience a high degree of variability in demand-lulls in work may be succeeded by rapid spikes of activity in a quite unpredictable manner. Furthermore, producing specialized or customized products often requires that firms change specifications on the fly to meet the changing needs of customers. In theory, it makes sense for firms to subcontract out the manufacture of components where possible. This provides them with a higher degree of flexibility while allowing them to avoid paying for expensive machinery that would lie idle much of the time. However, if buyer firms are to rely on subcontractors to produce specialized components for their products, they require that these subcontractors be themselves highly flexible, able to respond rapidly to changing needs, and to work for long hours on short notice. Furthermore, it is important that each subcontractor produce well-tooled components that are compatible with the other components of the product, which may be produced by other firms. The buyer firm needs to engage in a process of complex coordination, which is only possible if it is sure that each subcontractor is preparing components to high standards of quality. Again, this requires that subcontractors be highly responsive to the technical needs of the buyer firm and be prepared to make changes in the course of the production process.
This involves commitment problems for both buyer firms and subcontractors. The firm putting out work has to be sure that it can rely on the subcontractor to respond flexibly: This may involve short-term costs for the subcontractor, which may find itself unexpectedly having to commit its staff to work overtime, or over weekends and holidays, to meet a particularly urgent order from the buyer firm. In the absence of some substantial arrangement between the two parties, it will often not be in the interests of the subcontractor to respond to the needs of the ordering firm; working over a weekend or during the holiday period may cost more than it is worth. On the other hand, when demand is slack, the subcontractor may find itself faced with long periods of inactivity and no guaranteed income. Furthermore, the buyer firm needs to be sure that the subcontractor does not supply substandard components, which may cause serious (and potentially expensive) delays. Finally, buyer firms may face a hold-up problem from their subcontractors: If a final firm must rely on a subcontractor to produce a part that is vital to the production process, the subcontractor may use its position of power to extort rents from the final firm.
The most obvious solution to this problem is to create the conditions for trust and cooperation between the final firm and subcontractor through a long-term relationship in which the producer commits to pay a premium over the longer run to reward the subcontractor's commitment. In such a relationship, the subcontractor's short-term costs may be counterbalanced by longer term profits deriving from the relationship, and the subcontractor furthermore has an incentive not to behave opportunistically insofar as the relationship will at some stage be opened for renegotiation. These incentives do not necessarily produce trust and cooperation; however, they may be used as anchors for more personalized relations between firms, which permit some level of generalized reciprocity between the two parties. Each party will be prepared to accept short-term imbalances because it trusts that the other party will reciprocate over time (Miller, 1992) .
contractors. If they make the first choice, they avoid the commitment problems involved in subcontracting, but they must also themselves produce components that could be produced more efficiently and cheaply outside the firm. If they make the second choice, they may be able to secure components more cheaply but they must face the problem of extracting credible commitments from their suppliers, as well as themselves making credible commitments to reward the suppliers for their flexibility.
Because the most important commitment problems in flexibly specialized production involve risks that are difficult to predict ex ante, one may reasonably predict that different institutional settings will be associated with different forms of production, because of the effects of institutional variation on trust and cooperation between actors. In settings where appropriate informal institutions predominate, one may expect that firms will rely heavily on outsourcing. Such informal institutions will provide the necessary anchor for trust and cooperation between firms precisely because they provide for trusting relations over a set of issues that is ex ante more diffuse. Given the clear efficiency gains that they can achieve by so doing, final firms will subcontract out as much of the production process as possible to specialized subcontractors. In settings where formal institutions predominate, final firms will find it substantially more difficult to create the trust and cooperation that is necessary for flexibility. They will thus tend to concentrate more of their production in house, taking advantage of the possibilities for informal cooperation within hierarchy that Gary Miller (1992) has described, forsaking subcontracting in issue areas where there are serious risks of opportunism.
THE CASES: MACHINERY PRODUCTION IN BOLOGNA AND STUTTGART
The main body of the article applies the above arguments about trust, cooperation, and institutions to two important industrial districts: the packaging machinery district in Bologna, capital city of Emilia-Romagna; and the machine tool district of Baden-Württemberg. These two cases were chosen using the comparable cases strategy to test the existing arguments of the industrial district literature and to provide variation on the independent variable. First, Baden-Württemberg and Emilia-Romagna are among the paradigmatic cases of the existing literature and may reasonably be taken as proxies for a more general phenomenon.
9 Second, they provide a high degree of 466 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / June 2005 9. On packaging machinery production in Bologna, see Bianchi and Gualteri (1990); Brusco et al. (1996); Capecchi (1997); and Curti and Grandi (1997) . On machine tool production in Stuttgart, see Braczyk (1996); Herrigel (1996b); and Staber (1996) . variation on the independent variable, institutional structure. Finally, they allow some control for extraneous variables.
10 They involve closely related industrial sectors, the packaging machinery industry (Bologna) and machine tools industry (Stuttgart), which have similar needs in the production process. Both produce specialized machinery on order for large customers and face a similar set of issues with regard to trust and cooperation in at least one important area of their activity, the vertical organization of production.
11
The Italian region of Emilia-Romagna has received considerable scholarly attention, both as an apparent example of policy success at the regional level (Leonardi & Nanetti, 1990; Nanetti, 1988; Putnam, 1993) and because of its unusual pattern of industrial production (Bianchi & Gualteri, 1990; Brusco, 1982; Putnam, 1993) . The packaging machinery district centered around Bologna and its suburbs is typical in many respects of the "Emilian model" of production. It involves a densely integrated cluster of firms specialized in the production of particular packaging machines. The Italian packaging machinery industry is dominated by Bologna and its hinterlands: Some 70% of Italian employment in the sector is located in Emilia-Romagna. ISTAT statistics suggest that some 27,532 individuals were employed in the machinery sector in Bologna in 1996, with 12,340 in the sector of specialized machinery, which is dominated by packaging machine production. The specialized machinery sector had 401 companies, and almost certainly also should include many other subcontractors who are incorrectly categorized in official statistics.
Stuttgart is the capital city of the German Land (state) of BadenWürttemberg, which has traditionally played an important role in the German machinery industry. Although German data protection law makes it difficult to gather detailed statistics on the machine tool sector, the region of Stuttgart had some 439 companies engaged in machine manufacture in 1996, with 78,792 workers. This figure includes a considerable variety of manufacturers, by no means all of which are machine tool producers; however, previFarrell / TRUST AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 467
10. There are differences between the cases under examination. For example, the final customers for machine tools in Baden-Württemberg are often large local firms, whereas Italian packaging machinery producers are more internationally oriented. Furthermore, horizontal forms of association differ between the two industries. However, neither of these differences seems likely to affect the vertical relations between machine makers and their subcontractors being considered in this article.
11. Much of the literature on Italy examines horizontal cooperation between firms in the production of collective goods. However, it is difficult to examine this comparatively; some goods that are provided through collective cooperation in Italy are provided through the state in Germany, with no need for cooperation among firms. In the vertical organization of production, in contrast, there is no scope for the state to provide a functional equivalent for trust and cooperation of this sort.
ous research (Porter, 1990) has established the existence of a machine tool cluster in the Stuttgart area. Like Italian firms, many German firms are world leaders in their market niches, although they have experienced increasing competition from Japanese and U.S. producers in recent years (Herrigel, 1996a) . Machine production in Baden-Württemberg has been identified as an industrial district, most prominently in the work of Gary Herrigel (1996b) , although there is some considerable controversy over whether it exhibits the same patterns of cooperation as its Italian equivalents (Cooke & Morgan, 1994; Grotz & Braun, 1997; Staber, 1996) .
The two machinery districts are embedded in highly different institutional systems. Much recent work in political economy highlights the importance of institutions capable of underpinning impersonal transactions as a component of economic success (Greif, 1994; North, 1990) . The Italian state has had only modest success in creating and implementing such institutions. As described by Marino Regini (1997) , Even when public policies apparently assign a leading role to state regulation, . . . mechanisms for circumventing them are often set in motion; or else the state rules are only weakly and inefficiently implemented, with the consequence that even the opposite result may be achieved. (p. 106) Not only is the state incapable of properly enforcing institutional rules, but the court system is cumbersome, inefficient, and perceived as being partial and politicized (Volcansek, 1990) . This has had important consequences for the political economy of Italy, leading to a high level of insecurity in the business environment (Trigilia, 1996) .
However, the weakness of national formal institutions creates opportunities for actors at the local level, which in some cases at least has allowed for the creation and persistence of local, informal rules governing economic exchange (Bagnasco & Trigilia, 1993; Locke, 1995; Regini, 1997) . The existing literature suggests that industrial districts typically involve just such rules (Bellandi, 1996 , Bianchi, 1993 , Brusco, 1990 Trigilia, 1989) . As described by Sebastiano Brusco (1992) , in industrial districts, alongside state regulations, there is a second set of rules that derives from the community to which all the companies belong. This set of rules, shared by everyone and to which everyone has to adapt, originates in civil society, and also carries a series of sanctions: whoever breaks the rules of the game is excluded from the community and can no longer work with it. (p. 182)
The prevailing literature suggests that Germany presents no such complicated mixture of weak, formal institutions and strong, local, informal institu-tions. Although local identity is still politically important in some contexts, the existing literature suggests that formal institutions are credible and effective; as Wolfgang Streeck (1997) puts it, "the institutions which embed [Germany's] economy and shape its performance are politically negotiated and typically legally constitutionalized, rather than commanding compliance as a matter of informal obligation" (p. 37; see also Arrighetti, Bachmann, & Deakin, 1997) . The result is a system in which there is little evidence of the kinds of local "community" rules that play such an important role in Italy (Glassmann & Voelzkow, 2001; Voelzkow, 1999) .
Thus the existing literature suggests that Italy and Germany provide a substantial degree of variation on the independent variable, institutional form. In Italy, the relative weakness of formal institutions at the national level is associated with a highly variegated economy, in which localized systems of community rules play an important part, especially in industrial districts. In Germany, in contrast, strong formal institutions are associated with a relatively uniform political economy, in which there is little evidence of the sorts of strong, localized, informal institutions that structure economic relationships in Italy.
TRUST AND COOPERATION BETWEEN FIRMS IN INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS
There is clear evidence of differences in subcontracting patterns in the two case studies, which are linked to differences in institutional settings. Italian interviewees made it clear that the judicial system was ineffective in providing enforcement; firms were reluctant to go to court even when they clearly had a good case.
[Legal action] is a waste of money {spendere soldi per niente}. Because in a legal action, one spends money on the lawyers, then it goes on, in practice, for two years, three years, four years, five years, ten years, then it never finishes. 12 However, the packaging machinery district of Bologna, like other such districts, had a set of local rules-community institutions-that governed the behavior of both final firms and subcontractors. As one Italian interviewee put it, a firm that does not cooperate comes to be excluded from the system. Slowly, one does not have credibility any more, which allows one to remain in the system. The world of packaging is very small-even if it is big it is very small. It is thus that it is, there are many personal relations that serve also sometimes to avoid situations which . . . do not have to be solved through legal means. He who doesn't keep to this rulethese aren't written rules-well there you are! (beh!) 13 These rules turned for the most part on probity in personal relations between actors. As described by one interviewee, there is a saying in these parts that a handshake is worth more than a piece of paper with writing on it . . . this is an approach which is particularly characteristic of someone from Emilia-Romagna. If someone steps out of line once, tries to be clever in some way . . . there is a characteristic tendency which is particular to this area . . . to cancel [the deal].
14 Not only would opportunism lead to a cancellation of the immediate deal, but there was likely to be a "freezing off" of relations extending into the future.
15
These informal rules involved more than the simple punishment of opportunists by those whom they had cheated. Reputational mechanisms played an important part in the packaging district, so that those who had cheated would not only be punished by the injured party but also find it far more difficult to find future trading partners. This is a very small world. Reputation spreads in three days . . . in three hours, not days. This is a small world, everybody knows everybody, and this is good in one sense, because if you have a good reputation, . . . you can capitalize on it, because you are known and this is bad, because if you have a bad reputation and have done something wrong, everybody knows it, and they try to avoid you. 16 This provided firms with a clear incentive to behave in a trustworthy fashion.
From the point of view of the subcontractors a mistaken behavior, [with] a rather small yield, will become known very quickly in the productive system to the other customers, and thus it is easy to exclude this firm from the relations of production. In this case we have a transparency of the market which makes it much more difficult to maintain incorrect behavior. There is an unmistakable resemblance between the social equilibrium that these informal rules led to and the forms of nonstate enforcement modeled by game theorists such as Avner Greif (1994) , Paul Milgrom, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast (1990), and Randall Calvert (1995a) . In these models, too, communication between actors may allow honest behavior in bilateral relationships, even if the number of actors is quite large. Like Avner Greif's (1994) Maghribi traders, Bolognese packaging machine manufacturers invest in gossip with each other, conveying information about their relationships with subcontractors. And like Greif's agents, subcontractors who are known to have cheated find it difficult to form new relationships with firms in the community, and soon find themselves excluded from new business opportunities.
18
The existence of these informal institutions, which mandated personal honesty in business relations, allowed producer firms to put work out to subcontractors. Furthermore, the final firms could commit to their subcontractors, and vice versa, without resort to formal contracts. Formally binding contracts were rare in the district; only a few of the very largest firms seem to have used them. As a rule, informal relationships between business actors were sufficient. In the words of the firms themselves, "The long-term things, I would say that there is nothing written. In practice, there is nothing like a contract. There is a tacit consensus, whereby we have work and make orders from these subcontractors" 19 ; and "with Italian subcontractors, or in the neighborhood, one has to work (giocare) on the personal and emotional plane. It is verbal, not all written down" 20 ; and
To have then the work of the artisan at the beginning of the year, one makes an accord. We ask for the best work. With the duty of doing the best work for us. . . . most times it is a verbal agreement 21 ;
and "There is no formalized contract, one works a lot on reciprocal knowledge, on reciprocal trust" 22 ; and "What is applied is not a specific contract, it
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18. I here want to note one problem in applying such models to cooperation: In real life, retaliation for opportunism is not only driven by rationalistic calculus. Some "types" may punish even when this is costly, and there was evidence to suggest that retaliation for opportunism in Bologna was sometimes nonrational in this sense.is a personal relationship between an office which puts out work and a small artisanal organisation which produces it."
23
Because of the reputational penalties that final firms would suffer if they reneged on their personal commitments, subcontractors could trust them enough to reciprocate in turn, refraining from behaving in an opportunistic fashion and providing flexibility in the short term in the knowledge that their commitment would be rewarded over the long run. The conditions for a quite generalized form of gift exchange, with extensive cooperation, were met because informal institutions allowed actors to commit credibly to each other, and thus to trust in each others' credible commitments.
In practice, it might be as if they were ours, to have relationships thus, consolidated over the long term, without disagreements, always with respect for these relationships which we had before. Always working in good harmony, with the consequence of good results. This is fundamental. Precisely because it is a decisive part of the machine. 24 and more generally, "I would say that the characteristic of this sector is this; an extreme interchange and collaboration between . . . suppliers, and firms who produce the goods." 25 These relationships of collaboration and exchange involved a very high degree of flexibility on the part of subcontractor firms. Several firms spoke of the willingness of subcontractors to work long hours for them at short notice. "From this collaboration comes the availability on their part to work also 12 hours a day for a week, in order to finish a machine" 26 ; and
If we have a date 30 days away, or at the end of the month, I will telephone them and say "Look, the piece has to come 15 days early, because something unexpected has turned up, and can you do it soon?" tions which we have with our suppliers in this network, which participate in our results. 28 Furthermore, problems of hold up appeared exceedingly rare. Indeed, at least in some cases, final firms were prepared to order specialized parts from subcontractors with whom they had a relationship without bargaining over price until after the piece had been produced. Although this may sometimes have led to difficulties for final firms, these difficulties did not involve subcontractors opportunistically jacking up prices after the fact but the uncertainties of trying to fix a final price with the customer for a particular machine without knowing the costs of all the inputs.
The relations of generalized reciprocity that were supported by these informal institutions furthermore allowed a radical dis-integration of the production process in the Bologna packaging machine industry. As described by a local economic research organization,
The production cycle in the mechanical sector is broken up into various phases of work, which leads to a high reliance on the flexible specialisation model. Because of this, we have systems in which the firms at the center are specialised in certain phases of production, solely assembly and planning, and all the phases of the production process are delegated to other firms, which are specialised.
29
The production of specific components was usually carried out by a multitude of artisanal firms, each specializing in a particular phase of the production process, working on behalf of larger firms which sold the final product. "Little artisanal outfits that . . . provide particular mechanisms [are] a Bolognese tradition. Firms do not produce one part of the goods that they may come to sell; they are made by subcontractors."
30
The usual arrangement was thus one in which final producers designed the machines, sent the specifications for particular parts and mechanisms to smaller producers, and then assembled, sold, and maintained the final product. The process of assembly [montaggio] was more important than it sounded; indeed, it was perhaps the most strategic part of the manufacturing cycle. Italian manufacturing firms usually did wish to retain some control over the process of ensuring that components manufactured by different firms worked well together. But firms sometimes put even this vital part of the manufacturing process out to others.
The situation is that we don't produce anything inside. We make everything outside-that is typical. We only do the planning and the assembly. And the testing. Then, not only [the above], we sometimes subcontract out the assembly, when we have a lot of requests. Thus, one also sometimes subcontracts out planning. Technical studies. Thus, the only thing that we don't want to subcontract is the sales.
31
This dis-integration of the production system captured certain economies that were not available in more conventional production relations.
[The system of production in Emilia-Romagna] has allowed one to have wide specialisation with modest investments. Why? Because the artisan, who has acquired this machine for doing this stage of work, [does] 8 hours, 12 hours, 15 hours, 20 hours. One specialises in this sector, and amortises the cost of the machine much more quickly. . . . In the German "system," between inverted commas, a big firm buys machines, and works to do this stage of work only for those pieces which it needs for its own production. Probably, this machine remains unused most of the time. Then, the amortisation of costs is slower.
32
Thus in summary, informal institutions in the Bologna packaging machinery district allowed actors credibly to commit to each other and thus to trust each other enough to maintain relationships that involved a high level of reciprocity and gift exchange. This in turn provided the necessary flexibility to allow firms to subcontract out highly sensitive and important parts of the production process. The production process was thus dis-integrated to an extraordinary extent; extraordinary at least in the eyes of conventional Williamsonian transaction cost economics. 33 However, a more sophisticated institutionalist approach that examines both institutions (Knight, 1992; North, 1990 ) and the equilibrium outcomes that they may lead to may explain forms of trust and cooperation that seem at first sight to defy explanation in terms of the rational actor model.
The machine tool industry of Stuttgart involved a rather different vertical organization of production, as might have been expected given the differences in institutional context. Although formal institutions, in contrast to Italy, were effective and credible, there was little evidence of the kinds of extensive informal community institutions that characterized the Bologna Miller (1992) . 33. Although it is not impossible for a transaction-cost approach to explain these divergences, Williamson's version of transaction cost economics pays no sustained attention to the impact of external institutions, focusing instead on the specific nature of the transaction itself. machinery industry. Thus extensive subcontracting of the sort typical in Bologna was quite rare. As one Italian interviewee, in an unprompted description, depicted the difference, The German system sees the firm, which is to say the unit of production, as an almost complete system, where one carries out all of the activities which form the product. In Italy, social organisation is different, historically. . . . An industrial firm in Bologna-however, it is more or less like this in the rest of Italy too-plans this part for itself, which makes up part of a complete machine. It does the design, and then there is an entire series of external workers, to which it sends the design for getting the primary material. And then, it passes this on to another who does the first stage of work, and then onto another who does another stage of work; this is the procedure for returning a finished part, or perhaps [it is] already assembled into a small group which is mounted onto the principal machine.
34
This dichotomy was rather overstated but did capture genuine differences between the two systems. Although the decision of whether to subcontract did not only depend on whether subcontractors could be trusted not to behave opportunistically, it was clear that it was substantially more difficult in Stuttgart than in Bologna to achieve the necessary kinds of generalized reciprocity. Of the relevant interviewees in Bologna, only three very large firms did not rely on extensive subcontracting, and two of those three still subcontracted out up to 70% of components. In Baden-Württemberg, just the opposite was true; only a very small proportion of firms engaged in extensive subcontracting (see below).
35 A large proportion of the firms interviewed in Baden-Württemberg preferred not to rely on outside subcontractors except for standardized inputs because of the time wasted in bargaining or because firms could not be relied on to deliver parts on time or to provide the necessary quality. As one firm responded, when asked whether it outsourced work, No, we have an in-house production of over 90%. This is clearly related to the fact that we face ever shorter times for our products, and therefore can't spend a lot of time negotiating over supplies-"Can you make me this, and what does it cost?" and so on. That doesn't work. 36 Farrell / TRUST AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 475 34. Firm Interview 8. The interviewee had been asked a general question about differences between the Italian and German vocational training systems.
35. One might reasonably object that this disparity may result from the sample size, which may lead to distorted or inaccurate findings. However, other, larger N statistical surveys support the broad picture of subcontracting practice suggested by my research results, even while they do not, by their nature, address the finer grained questions of trust and cooperation discussed in this article.
36. Firm Interview 33.
Another firm found that it could be "simply more flexible" if it relied on internal production rather than outside firms. It had found that it could not rely on subcontractors to deliver in a timely fashion: "It has sometimes happened that a supplier says 'I cannot supply this part this week any more.' And I need it urgently." 37 A third firm reported similar difficulties in getting subcontractors to deliver on time; it had also sometimes received parts that were unusable or that required extensive remachining.
38 A fourth firm spoke of the problem of information transfer; it could not be sure that firms at a geographical remove would consistently implement technical changes to improve the product.
39 A fifth firm had previously had outsourced work to a foreign firm but had ceased because of quality concerns with the components being supplied. Now it produced all of its work in-house. 40 Another group of firms went somewhat further; they did outsource components, but only where such components were not critical to the firm's specialist strengths. One firm had recently begun a strategy of putting out as much work as it could, but only "that part that is neither time-critical nor quality critical, and that has no significant value added for us. In this way, we want to concentrate on our core competences, and reduce our in-house production" (Fertigungstief) . 41 Other firms had resorted to outsourcing during a period of crisis in the German machine industry between 1991 and 1993. This was sometimes simply a temporary response to short-term market difficulties:
The trend previously was to work more with subcontractors. That was also naturally affected by the recession, in that one sought to keep as little in-house as possible, so as to reduce costs. I am rather positive to the opposite strategy, namely, making a lot in-house. In other words, now that we are over the worst years I would rather take a risk and add an employee. 42 However, in other cases the crisis had led to longer term organizational changes; a very small number of firms had moved to a much more extensive dependence on subcontracting. 43 Clearly, this group of firms had managed, to some considerable extent, to create the conditions for generalized reciprocity. As in Italy, this involved the creation of long-term relationships with suppliers who provided critical components. For things of central importance, we have long term relationships. When someone uses production parts that are of elementary significance for the machine, than one can't go on the principle of "Here today, gone tomorrow." It doesn't work. One then needs long-term relationships. 44 and We need those strong connections because we need to be as flexible as we are. We cannot work with subcontractors who are not willing to change designs shortly before delivery, whatever that means in detail. We cannot place an order 4 months before the delivery and not be able to change anything in between.
45
Given the very small number that engaged in extensive subcontracting, it is difficult to make definitive assertions; however, the evidence suggests that there was a key difference between the kinds of long-term relationships found in Bologna and Stuttgart. The latter did not involve diffuse informal commitments but were instead based on formal contracts.
46
That is why our subcontractors usually know the amount of work that they will have for us. We do not order individual components from them. We contract the amount of business for the next year or for the next two years or for the next three years, so they have already contracted all the work they will have for us for the next three years. The only thing which is not fixed is the date of the delivery for the individual components. So we have very long term contracts with companies, and that is why they are easily willing to help us when we need changes. 47 These contracts did not spell out in detail the obligations of the two parties but instead provided a technology of commitment. The final firm could commit to a long-term relationship with the subcontractor, but the subcontractor had an incentive to provide flexibility insofar as the contract would, at some stage in the future, be opened up for renegotiation. Formal contracts thus served as a partial substitute for the informal relations of obligation characteristic of subcontracting relations in Bologna. However, they carried a cost. Unlike informal obligations, they limited the final firm's ability to flexibly respond to changing market circumstances: It had formally agreed to take a number of components over a certain period. In Bologna, in contrast, final firms could deal more flexibly with changes in demand. As one Italian interviewee put it, "There is always a turnover of work . . . one never does contracts of one year, two years . . . Not ever with the difficulties [that there would be] for a firm of our size in making long-term contracts with external suppliers."
48
This allowed an "extreme flexibility [in the relationship], especially where the quantity of work is extremely reduced."
49 Thus formal institutions, even when they provided the basis for reciprocal relations between final firms and subcontractors, carried a cost; they tied the final firm to specific and formal obligations that carried into the future.
In summary, then, the absence of the kinds of extensive informal institutions found in Bologna meant that business actors in Stuttgart could not trust in each others' personal commitments as a means to secure reciprocity. This had two effects. First, an extensive reliance on subcontracting was relatively rare in Stuttgart, in contrast to Bologna where it was the norm. Second, where such subcontracting did take place, it seemed to rest on formal rather than informal institutions, with important consequences for the forms of cooperation observed.
CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of trust and cooperation in the two case studies supports the basic contentions of the simple account of institutions and trust that I have outlined. First, even if Williamsonian transaction cost economics fails to explain observed outcomes, important forms of trust and cooperation found in industrial districts can be explained even if actors are selfishly rational. 50 In the "strong" Italian case, a radical dis-integration of the production process, which seems on the face of it to involve nonrational trust between actors, could in fact be explained by the presence of informal institutions. These informal institutional rules made it rational to behave in a trustworthy fashion 478 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / June 2005 48. Firm Interview 9, italics added. 49. Firm Interview 9. 50. I am not seeking to assert that actors are always rational in industrial districts; rather, I wish to argue that the strong resemblance between the kinds of cooperation observed, and the predictions of game theory, suggest that the latter provide useful tools for modeling the former. Although models of subgame perfect equilibrium usually emphasize the costliness of punishment, social order under such assumptions can be maintained if "shunning" not only affects defectors but those who refuse to punish defectors. See Calvert (2000) . I am grateful to Randy Calvert and Gary Miller for a highly useful conversation on this topic.
in personalized relations between business actors. Those who did not found themselves excluded from future opportunities to do business, not only with the party they had cheated but with other business actors in the community, who communicated among each other about their experiences in subcontracting relationships. The set of relations supported by these institutions strongly resembled those equilibria involving cooperation in nonstate settings that have been modeled by game theorists. Thus institutions both gave actors incentives to behave in a trustworthy manner and led to the dissemination of information that allowed actors to trust each other with regard to a specific-and highly important-set of issues.
Second, institutional variation led, as predicted, to variation in patterns of trust and cooperation. 51 In the German case study, where there were no extensive informal institutions of the sort found in Italy, firms typically were not able to trust each other enough to cooperate through the kinds of extensive subcontracting found in Italy. In the few cases where they did rely substantially on subcontracting, it appeared to involve formal institutions, which had important implications for the kind of cooperative relationship that could be sustained. In contrast to Italy, where informal institutions supported a highly flexible form of reciprocal gift exchange, which could shift according to changes in demand, German final firms, if they wished to make credible commitments to their subcontractors, had to do so through relatively inflexible contractual forms.
This explains how variation in patterns of trust and cooperation with regard to specific issues may occur against the direction predicted by those scholars who see diffuse interpersonal trust as an important explanatory variable. Diffuse interpersonal trust, far from being an immutable cultural orientation, may be viewed as the contingent result of particular institutional arrangements; in particular, effective formal institutions (Levi, 1996 (Levi, , 1998 . It may furthermore be distinguished from the kinds of trust and cooperation that are likely to occur in settings dominated by informal institutions, where one may expect deeper forms of trust and cooperation albeit most likely among smaller groups of actors.
